So explains John Lott, in
an opinion column for Foxnews.com. Not a surprising
result. The McDonald v. Chicago
amicus brief
I wrote for the International Law Enforcements Educators &
Trainers Association (and other law enforcement
organizations, and criminologists) showed that after
Chicago enacted its handgun ban, its violent crime rate
rose sharply. Pre-ban, Chicago had a violent crime rate
1.12 times greater than the violent crime rate of the 24
other largest cities. (That is, Chicago’s violent crime
rate was 12% higher than that of the 24 other cities.)
Post-ban, Chicago’s crime rate soared immediately, and
remained 67% higher than the other large cities. The
possibility that Chicago’s sudden and long-standing
deterioration compared to other large cities is less than
1 in 100,000. Details are presented at pages 17–22 of the
brief, and the appendices.
That’s the
question posed today over at Scotusblog. It’s the
premiere of the
Scotusblog Community, which aims to encourage
discussions by Scotusblog readers. To start the ball
rolling, Scotusblog solicited short comments (up to 2
paragraphs) from Erwin Chemerinsky, Dawn Johnsen, Ilya
Shapiro, Stephen Presser, Adam Winkler, and me, among
others.
My answer to what the Supreme Court should
do is:
The Court should re-affirm Gibbons v. Ogden,
which followed the original understanding of the
interstate commerce clause: “commerce” means
mercantile exchange, plus some closely-related
subjects, such as navigation. Among the subjects
which are not interstate commerce, according to
Gibbons, are “health laws of every description.”
The Court should then over-rule South-Eastern
Underwriters (1944), which broke from
long-established precedent, and declared that even
purely intrastate insurance was interstate
commerce. Because South-Eastern claimed to be
following original meaning, the modern Court
should simply point out that none of the original
sources cited by the South-Eastern opinion
remotely support the contention that all forms of
insurance are “commerce.”
Finally, Congress
should explain that the Necessary and Proper
clause underscores the unconstitutionality of the
mandate. As McCulloch v. Maryland demonstrated,
the original meaning of the clause affirms the
Congress may exercise powers which are incidental
to an enumerated power. The power to compel a
private person to engage in commerce with a
private company is not an incident of, or lesser
than, the power to regulate voluntary interstate
commerce. Further, government-created monopolies
were, in the Founding Era, a paradigmatic example
of improper government action. Therefore, it is
not constitutionally “proper” to force citizens to
spend their money on a government-favored Big
Insurance oligopoly.
The rationale for the above can be found in my
articles
Bad News
for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate,
121 Yale Law Journal Online (forthcoming 2011)(with
Gary Lawson); “Health
Laws of Every Description”: John Marshall’s Ruling
on a Federal Health Care Law, 12 Engage 49 (June
2011) (with Robert G. Natelson);
Commerce in the Commerce Clause: A Response to
Jack Balkin, 109 Michigan Law Review First
Impressions 55 (2010) (with Natelson); and Health
insurance is not ‘commerce’: A single erroneous
Supreme Court precedent from 1944, South-Eastern
Underwriters, should be overturned, National Law
Journal, March 28, 2011 (with Natelson) (available on
Lexix/Nexis).
Since Scotusblog is trying to get people to comment
on its own website, I’m not opening comments on this
post, and I encourage you to share you thoughts over
at Scotusblug.
Currently before the Illinois Supreme Court is
People v. Aguilar, which raises the question of
whether Illinois can, consistently with the Second
Amendment, prohibit the carrying of firearms for lawful
self-defense in public places. Illinois is the only state
with such a blanket prohibition. Illinois state law bans
open and concealed carry, and has no procedure for
licensing either. The only people allowed to exercise the
right to defensive carry are persons in some
specially-favored categories, such as elected officials
and security guards.
Oklahoma City Univ. law professor Michael O’Shea has
written
an
amicus brief in the case, on behalf of co-authors of
the forthcoming law school textbook
Firearms Law
and the Second Amendment (Aspen, 2012). O’shea’s
co-authors Nicholas Johnson (Fordham) and I both made some
suggestions for the brief, but the vast majority of the
work was done by O’Shea. As the brief demonstrates,
McDonald and Heller make it clear that the
Second Amendment protects a right to carry arms (except in
“sensitive places”). The brief does not argue in favor of
a particular system for licensed or unlicensed carry.
Rather, our point is that a complete prohibition is
facially unconstitutional; there is no need to get into
the standard of review issues that would be involved in a
regulation (as opposed to a complete prohibition) of the
exercise of the right to bear arms.
Very early next year–in time for 2d semester classes in
the 2011-12 academic year–Aspen Publishers will publish
the first law school textbook on the the Second Amendment.
The title is Firearms Law and the Second Amendment:
Regulation, Rights, and Policy. The co-authors are
Nicholas Johnson (Fordham), Michael O’Shea (Oklahoma
City), George Mocsary (Connecticut), and me.
Below the fold is the full Table of Contents and
Preface for the book. (Pasting the Word document into the
blog format significantly altered many of the indents,
line spacing, and outline numbering for chapter
subdivisions, so the TOC below does not look exactly like
the TOC of the book itself.) Because the textbook is
currently in the production process, review copies are not
yet available. Indeed, the Aspen website’s promotional
page for the book is still several weeks away. However, if
you might use the textbook next semester, and would like
to see some chapters, just contact any of the co-authors,
and we can mail them to you.
The 11 chapters of the printed textbook proceed
chronologically, from ancient Rome, Greece, and China, all
the way to the post–Heller cases. Four
additional, on-line only chapters cover some special
topics. Those electronic chapters will be available to all
students and professors using the textbook.
Besides being sold as a conventional hardback,
Firearms Law will also be available in individual
electronic chapters. So if you are teaching a
constitutional law course and would like to include a 2 or
3 week unit on the Second Amendment, your students could
buy chapter 9 (Heller and McDonald) plus
chapter 11 (post–Heller cases in the lower
courts). Or if you’re teaching an advanced criminal law
class, you might want to have your students buy chapter 8,
which covers the modern criminal law of gun control,
particularly under the federal Gun Control Act.
Continue reading ‘New law school textbook on the
Second Amendment and firearms regulation’ »
On Tuesday I testified before the U.S. House
subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
regarding H.R. 822, which would set up a national system
of interstate reciprocity for concealed handgun carry
permits. My 24-page written testimony is
here. The
video of the subcommittee hearing is about and hour
and 45 minutes. Nearly all members of the 21-member
attended the hearing, and used their opportunity to ask 5
minutes worth of questions. Most of the questions posed to
George Mason Law’s Prof. Joyce Malcolm, Philadelphia
Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey, and me, were quite
thoughtful. Some congressional hearings are just a form of
kabuki theater, but in Tuesday’s hearing, Representatives
of both parties, and on both sides of the gun issue,
seemed to be sincerely trying to learn more. The bill
currently has 243 House co-sponsors.
Rob Natelson
explains it all in his latest blog post. Short answer:
if the purpose of the tax is raising revenue (e.g., the
Stamp Act), it’s a tax. If the purpose is the regulation
of commerce (e.g., a prohibitive tariff on imported French
clothing; a shipping tax dedicated to paying for harbor
improvements), then it’s not a “tax” in the the
constitutional sense. Rather, it is a regulation of
commerce.
The American colonists believed that Parliament had
full authority to regulate external commerce, such as by
imposing protectionist tariffs. The colonists also
believed that Parliament had no authority to impose
domestic taxes in the colonies (such as the Stamp Act).
The colonists had a very firm sense of the distinction,
and ended up going to war over Parliament’s refusal to
respect that distinction. Because the Obamacare mandate is
designed purely to control behavior, and not to raise
revenue (even if it, like a protectionist tariff on French
clothing does ultimately raise a little revenue), the
Obamacare mandate is a type of commerce regulation, and
not a tax in the constitutional sense. That, at least, is
what the original meaning tells us.
Of course whether the individual mandate actually
qualifies as a regulation of “commerce...among the several
States” is a separate issue. The original meaning question
for the mandate’s penalty is a commerce issue, not a tax
issue.
That’s the question raised by a lawsuit in Colorado’s
federal district court, in the case of Kerr v.
Hickenlooper. In an
amicus brief, I suggest that the answer is “no.” The
brief relies heavily on the scholarship of my Independence
Institute colleague Rob Natelson, who happens to be the
leading scholarly expert on the Guarantee clause.
In short, the Founders defined a “republic” to include
governments such as those of ancient Athens, Carthage, and
Sparta, all of which included elements of direct
democracy. According to Minor v. Happersett (U.S.
1875), the decision of Congress to admit a state to the
Union is conclusive proof that, at the time, the state had
a Republican Form of Government. Massachusetts and Rhode
Island had referenda when they were admitted. The
progressive movement for initiative and referendum began
in the last 19th century. Congress chose to admit Oklahoma
(1907) which had very strong I&R provisions in its state
constitution, and New Mexico (1911), whose statehood
constitution specifically provided for the creation of a
citizen initiative system.
Courts have held that the Republican Form of Government
issue is not justiciable, and enforcement is up to
Congress. The amicus brief, however, addresses the merits
of the issue.
Today South Carolina Republican Senator Jim Demint
hosted a forum at which five Republican presidential
candidates spoke.
The transcript is here. Each candidate appeared one at
a time, and the format allowed for in-depth questions and
answers. Among the questioners was Princeton University’s
Robert George. Prof. George asked each candidate if he or
she would support congressional legislation, under section
5 of the 14th Amendment, to ban abortion. To state the
obvious, such legislation would be contrary not only to
Roe v. Wade and Penn. v. Casey (abortion
rights are protected by section 1 of the 14th Amendment),
but also to Boerne v. Flores (Congress cannot use
section 5 to protect a right in defiance of direct Supreme
Court holding about the particular aspect of the right).
The question explicitly presumed that Roe v. Wade
had not been overturned, and that a Human Life Amendment
to the Constitution had not been adopted.
The candidates’ answers were as follows:
Bachmann: Yes.
Cain: Yes.
Gingrich: Yes. Cooper v. Aaron’s assertion
of judicial supremacy was wrong. Following the
precedent of the first Jefferson administration, I
would abolish some federal judgeships. But I am not as
bold as Jefferson. “I would do no more than eliminate
Judge Barry in San Antonio and the ninth circuit.
That’s the most I would go for. (LAUGHTER) (APPLAUSE).
But let me say this. That’s part of the national
debate. That’s not a rhetorical comment. I believe the
legislative and executive branches have an obligation
to defend the constitution against judges who are
tyrannical and who seek to impose un-American values
on the people of the United States.”
Paul: No. Violence and murder should be dealt with
by the states. The federal police are already too
numerous. I support a bill to deprive lower federal
courts of jurisdiction over abortion cases, so that
state restrictions on abortion would be immune from
judicial review.
Romney: No. I would focus on appointing judges who
would return abortion regulation to the states. The
George proposal “would create obviously a
constitutional crisis. Could that happen in this
country? Could there be circumstances where that might
occur? I think it’s reasonable that something of that
nature might happen someday. That’s not something I
would precipitate.”
Personally, I agree with the Romney approach. Moreover,
the next President is going to have to address a fiscal
crisis that will devastate the United States economy soon
if it is not solved. Dealing with the fiscal crisis is
going to be quite difficult politically, in part because
there are many millions of people who benefit from the
current, and unsustainable, levels of federal spending.
The tax consumers may be very highly resistant to any
reduction in the amount of money that flows to them. So
there will be no shortage of national division and
acrimony. Thus, 2013 would be an especially bad time to
precipitate a constitutional crisis over a social issue.
The answers of Romney and Paul displayed prudence, which I
think is a very important characteristic for a President,
and the answers of Bachmann, Cain, and Gingrich did not.
As for the Ninth Circuit, Gingrich has
been saying the same thing since March, according to
Politico. I have not found anywhere where he has provided
details on this plan, but perhaps it would involve merging
the 9th circuit states into the 8th and 10th circuits,
since they border the 9th. The Politico article is not
entirely clear, but it appears that Gingrich has claimed
that he could get rid of the 9th circuit by signing an
executive order. This would be plainly unconstitutional, a
usurpation of power worthy of impeachment. Article III
gives Congress, not the President, the power to “ordain
and establish” the inferior federal courts. During the
Jefferson administration, the Judiciary Act of 1802
repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801, in which the lame duck
Federalist Congress had created many new federal
judgeships, to which President John Adams had appointed
Federalists in the waning days of his administration. As
President Jefferson recognized, the choice to eliminate
federal judgeships belongs to Congress, not the President
acting by himself. [Update: a commenter says the video
(for which a link was not provided) shows that Gingrich
was not claiming that he could abolish the 9th Cir. by
executive order. I looked on the Internet, and did not
find a video of the March 25 Iowa speech by Gingrich.
There’s a video of a speech earlier that month in Iowa, in
which he criticizes the 9th cir. but does not call for its
abolition.]
My
recent article for America’s 1st Freedom
traces the rise and fall of the theory that the Second
Amendment is not an individual right, but instead is a
“collective right,” which, like “collective property” in a
communist country, supposedly belongs to everyone
collectively, but in fact belongs to no-one. The theory
was created by a federal district judge in 1935, formally
named by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1968, and became
popular among lower federal courts during the next
quarter-century.
Historical and textual analysis made it increasingly
clear that the theory was completely implausible, and it
was unanimously rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
2008 case District of Columbia v. Heller. In that
case, all nine justices agreed that the Second Amendment
right was individual, while they disagreed about its
scope.
Tags:
Collective right,
Second Amendment
This
essay, which I wrote in 2000, celebrates the brave men
and women of the Colorado labor movement, who in the coal
fields of southern Colorado early in the 20th century,
stood up against murderous company goons and against the
soldiers of the Colorado National Guard who perverted
their organization.
Labor Day is a day to remember that labor rights are
human rights, and that the right of Americans to come
together in voluntary organizations, including labor
unions, is part of the core of American freedom. On
Veterans Day or Memorial Day, we remember that the
freedoms we enjoy today are the fruit of the sacrifices
made by our armed forces. We remember this even if we
disagree with some military actions, or even if we know
that some past or present military leaders were bad
people. Likewise, on Labor Day, even if we recognize the
harmfulness of much of the current agenda of SEIU, NEA,
and so on, we should remember the historic debt that all
Americans owe to the Labor movement. One part of that debt
is the essential role that labor leaders such as Walter
Reuther and Lane Kirkland played in providing bipartisan
support for resistance to the evil Soviet empire, an
empire whose ultimate objective was to reduce all the
workers of the world to slavery.