ALL THE
WAY DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE:
GUN PROHIBITION IN ENGLAND AND
SOME LESSONS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA
Is it possible for a
nation to go from wide-open freedom for a civil liberty, to near-total
destruction of that liberty, in just a few decades? "Yes," warn many American
civil libertarians, arguing that allegedly "reasonable" restrictions on civil
liberty today will start the nation down "the slippery slope" to severe
repression in the future.[3] In
response, proponents of today's reasonable restrictions argue that the jeremiads
about slippery slopes are unrealistic or even paranoid.[4]
This Essay aims to refine the understanding
of slippery slopes by examining a particular nation that did slide all the way
down the slippery slope.(p.400) When the twentieth century began, the right to
arms in Great Britain was robust, and subject to virtually no restrictions. As
the century closes, the right has been almost obliterated. In studying the
destruction of the British right to arms, this Essay draws conclusions about how
slippery slopes operate in real life, and about what kinds of conditions
increase or decrease the risk that the first steps down a hill will turn into a
slide down a slippery slope.
For purposes of this Essay, the reader will
not be asked to make a judgement about the righteousness of the (former) British
right to arms or the wisdom of current British gun prohibitions and controls.
Instead, the object is simply to examine how a right that is widely respected
and unrestricted can, one "reasonable" step at a time, be extinguished. This
Essay pays particular attention to how the public's "rights consciousness,"
which forms such a strong barrier against repressive laws, can weaken and then
disappear. The investigation of the British experience offers some insights
about the current gun control debate in the United States, and also about
ongoing debates over other civil liberties. This Essay does not require that the
reader have any affection for the British right to arms; presumably, the reader
does have affection for some civil liberties, and the Essay aims to discover
principles about how slippery slopes operate. These principles can be applied to
any debate where slippery slopes are an issue.
Part II of this
Essay briefly sets forth the legal background of the British right to bear arms,
as it developed from ancient times to the late nineteenth century. Part III describes
the unimpaired British right to arms of the late nineteenth century and the
changes in popular culture that began to threaten that right. Part IV describes
how social unrest before World War I intensified the pressure for gun control,
and finally resulted in the creation of a licensing system for rifles and
handguns after the war. The gun control system was gradually expanded in the
1930s, relaxed in enforcement during World War II when Nazi invasion loomed, and
then re-imposed with full force. Part V focuses on
the turbulent 1960s, and how the government enacted a mild licensing system for
shotguns, in order to deflect public cries for re-imposition of the death
penalty, following the murder of three policemen by criminals using pistols. Part VI describes
how the British gun licensing system is administered today and how police
discretion is used to make the system much more restrictive, even without
changes in statutory language. Part VII analyzes
the conditions that have created the momentum for the gradual prohibition of all
firearms ownership in Great Britain, and how isolated but sensational crimes are
used as launching pads for further steps to prohibition. In Part VIII the Essay
looks at how armed self-defense has, without statutory change, gone from being a
"good reason" for the granting of a gun license to being prohibited. The decline
of other British civil liberties in the late twentieth century, such as freedom
of speech, protection from warrantless searches, and criminal procedure
safeguards, is discussed in Part (p.401)IX.
Finally, Part X
summarizes and elaborates on some of the conditions that make possible a fall
down the slippery slope.
Throughout this Essay, parallels are drawn
between British history and the modern gun control debate in the United States,
because the issue of whether any particular set of controls will set the stage
for gun prohibition is one of the hotly contested questions in the contemporary
discussion.
It began as a duty,
operated as a mixed blessing for Kings, and wound up as one of the "true,
ancient, and indubitable"[5]
rights of Englishmen. From as early as 690,[6] the
defense of the realm rested in the hands of ordinary Englishmen. Under the
English militia system, every able-bodied freeman was expected to defend his
society and to provide his own arms, paid for and possessed by himself.[7] It
appears that the wearing of arms was widespread. The only early limitations
placed on gun possession were for the misuse of arms by appearing in certain
public places "with force" under a 1279 royal enactment[8] or
by using them "in affray of the peace."[9]
These limitations were construed to prohibit only the possession of arms
"accompanied with such circumstances as are apt to terrify the people"[10]
but not the mere "wearing [of] common weapons" for personal defense.[11]
The Tudor monarchs tried to prevent hunting
with crossbows, and later with firearms, by commoners by setting a minimum
annual income from land as a condition of hunting, or of possession of crossbows
and handguns.[12] They were unsuccessful and, after first liberalizing the
prohibitions, Henry VIII's government repealed them in 1546.[13]
As the Tudor era ended, individual armament (typically with long bows) and an
individual obligation to serve in the militia was the norm for Englishmen.
Historians view the widespread individual ownership of arms as an important
factor in the "moderation of monarchial rule and the development of the concept
of individual liberties"[14]
in England during a period when absolute, divine-right royal rule was expanding
as the norm in continental Europe.[15](p.402)
In the period leading up to the Glorious
Revolution, the Stuart monarchs adopted a radical policy of personal disarmament
toward those who politically threatened their royal prerogatives. This included
the militia of armed freemen as well as direct political rivals. Through a
series of parliamentary enactments, they tried registration of possession,
registration of sales, hunting restrictions,[16]
possession bans ostensibly aimed at controlling illegal hunting, restrictions on
personal arms possessed by the militia,[17]
warrantless searches, and confiscations.[18]
By 1689, the Stuart monarchs had succeeded, not at full disarmament, but at
alienating their "allies" as well as their opponents and losing their throne in
a bloodless revolution.
When William of Orange and Mary arrived to
begin their reign on England's throne, the country's political leaders
recognized the need to rein in any tendency of the new monarchs toward the
excessive royal power the nation had just suffered under James II. Thus, William
and Mary were required to accept a "declaration of rights" as a definitive
statement of the rights of their subjects. That declaration was later enacted as
the Bill of Rights.[19] The Declaration of Rights was prepared in great haste,
limited to noncontroversial matters, and viewed as a statement of the existing
rights of Englishmen. It contained only two individual rights applicable to the
general public: to petition and to arms. Furthermore, it only effectively
limited the monarch, not the Parliament. Even though the Bill of Rights was by
its terms to be upheld "in all times to come," nothing one Parliament does can
constrain the actions of subsequent Parliaments.[20]
That was the problem with the Bill of Rights being enacted as statute, however
important a statute. The Anglo-American legal world would not implement a
genuine constitution until 1776, when newly-independent Virginia created her
first.
The experience under the Stuarts,
demonstrating the political uses of disarmament, convinced many in the
Convention Parliament that there was great danger to the security of English
liberties from a disarmed citizenry.[21]
In Commons, member after member complained about the loss of liberty (p.403)they
had personally suffered when disarmed of their private arms by actions
"authorized" under the 1662 Militia Act, the 1671 Game Act, and various other
laws. Since the new monarchy was to be a limited one, the members saw both a
personal and national interest in the ability of ordinary Englishmen to possess
their own defensive arms to restrain the Crown. After much discussion and
numerous revisions, the right to arms evolved into a statement that "the
Subjects which are protestants may have Arms for their Defense suitable to their
Conditions and as allowed by law."[22]
Historian Joyce Lee Malcolm concluded that:
[t]he last-minute
amendments that changed that article from a guarantee of a popular power into
an individual right to have arms was a compromise forced on the Whigs. The
vague clauses about arms "suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law"
left the way open for legislative clarification and for perpetuation of
restrictions .... But though the right could be circumscribed, it had been
affirmed. The proof of how comprehensive the article was meant to be would
emerge from future actions of Parliament and the courts.[23]
By the time of the
American Revolution, legislation and court decisions had made it clear that
Englishmen had a real right to possess arms,[24]
even during times of turmoil such as the anti-Catholic Gordon riots in London in
1780. The Recorder of London, the equivalent of a modern-day city's general
counsel, gave this opinion in 1780:
The right of his
majesty's Protestant subjects, to have arms for their own defense, and to use
them for lawful purposes, is most clear and undeniable. It seems, indeed, to
be considered, by the ancient laws of this kingdom, not only as a right, but
as a duty; for all subjects of the realm, who are able to bear arms are bound
to be ready, at all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates,
in the execution of the laws and the preservation of the public peace. And
that right, which every Protestant most unquestionably possesses,
individually, may, and in many cases must, be exercised collectively, is
likewise a point which I conceive to be most clearly (p.404)established by the
authority of judicial decisions and ancient acts of parliament, as well as by
reason and common sense.[25]
Blackstone's celebrated
treatise lauded the individual right to arms as one of the "five auxiliary
rights of the subject," and explained that the right was for personal defense
against criminals, and for collective defense against government tyranny.[26]
He further explained that "in cases of national oppression, the nation has very
justifiably risen as one man, to vindicate the original contract subsisting
between the king and his people."[27]
The Englishman's boast that he and his countrymen were "the freest subjects
under Heaven" because he had the right "to be guarded and defended ... by [his]
own arms, kept in [his] own hands, and used at [his] own charge under [his]
Prince's Conduct"[28] was true. This did not mean, of course, that Englishmen
enjoyed perfect civil liberty, as those in the United States frequently pointed
out. Englishmen did, however, enjoy much greater freedom and participation in
government than did the people of Continental Europe, and it was England's
conventional wisdom that the freedom of the English people was closely tied to
their right to possess arms, and thereby deter any thought of usurpation by the
government.
From the day when the Stuarts fled to
France, there were virtually no restrictions on an Englishman's right to own and
carry firearms, providing that he did not hunt with them, for the next two
centuries. The only notable exceptions were the Seizure of Arms Act and the
Training Prevention Act, which banned drilling with firearms and allowed
confiscation of guns from revolutionaries in selected regions.[29]
The Acts were the product of social unrest related to the Industrial Revolution,
climaxing in the 1819 Peterloo Massacre, in which government forces killed
unarmed demonstrators. The Acts expired by their own terms in 1822. Even while
the 1819 Acts were in force, the case of Rex v. Dewhurst explained that
the "suitable to their condition" clause in the Bill of Rights's "Arms for their
Defense" guarantee did not allow the government to disarm "people in the
ordinary class of life."[30](p.405)
In the final decades of
the last century, Great Britain was much like the United States in the 1950s.
There were almost no gun laws, and almost no gun crime. The homicide rate per
100,000 population per year was between 1.0 and 1.5, declining as the century
wore on.[31] Two technological developments, however, began to work
together to create in some minds the need for gun control. The first of these
was the revolver. Revolvers had begun to achieve mass popularity when Colonel
Samuel Colt showed off his models at London's 1851 Great Exhibition of the Works
of Industry in All Nations.[32]
Revolver technology advanced rapidly, and by the 1890s, revolver design had
progressed about as far as it could, with subsequent developments involving
fairly minor tinkering.
As revolvers got cheaper and better,
concern arose regarding the increase in firepower available to the public. And
in fact, the change from one or two shot weapons to the repeat-firing, five or
six shot revolver represented perhaps the greatest advance in small arms
civilian firepower that has ever occurred. Compared to the seemingly more benign
single-shot muzzle-loaders of the past, the revolver seemed a frightening
innovation.[33]
Revolvers were also getting less expensive,
and concerns began to grow about the availability to criminals of cheap German
revolvers.[34] Cheap guns were, in some eyes, associated with hated
minority groups. For example, in the late 1860s, the London Lloyd's
Newspaper blamed a crime wave on "foreign refuse" with their guns and
knives. The newspaper stated that "[t]he revolver's appearance ... we owe to the
importation of reckless characters from America .... The Fenian [Irish-American]
desperadoes have sown weapons of violence in our poorer districts."[35]
All of these developments have their
parallels in modern United States. The current popularity of semi-automatic
pistols, with a magazine capacity of thirteen, fifteen, or seventeen rounds,
frightens some people who view the old six-shooter as a harmless traditional
weapon. Furthermore, the fact that semi-automatics were invented over 100 years
ago does not stop the press from portraying them as dangerous new guns, just as
the revolvers of the 1850s were portrayed as dangerous new guns in the
1880s.
Prejudice and discrimination against ethnic
groups persist. While United States gun control advocates do not complain much
about Irish immigrants with guns, they do warn about the dangers of Blacks armed
with "ghetto guns." The derisive term for inexpensive handguns, "Saturday Night
(p.406)Specials," has a racist lineage to the term "niggertown Saturday
night."[36] The phrase "niggertown Saturday night" apparently mixed with
the nineteenth century phrase "suicide special," which is a cheap single action
revolver, to form "Saturday night special."
Revolvers were one technological
development that began to make some Britons rethink the desirability of the
right to bear arms. The second development was the growth of the mass
circulation press. Newspapers, like guns, had been around for quite a while, but
the late nineteenth century witnessed several printing innovations that made
printing of vast quantities of newspapers extremely cheap.
The Walter press, patented in England in
1866, introduced stereotype plates. Printers discovered ways to make sheets of
any desired length, thereby allowing rolls of paper to be fed into cylinder
presses, and greatly accelerating printing speed. Machines for folding
newspapers were brought on-line. By the late nineteenth century, typesetting
machines were coming into use. All of these developments made possible the
production of low-cost newspapers, which even poor people could buy every day.
As audiences expanded, papers became increasingly sensationalist, and the
"yellow journalism" of publishers such as the United States' Joseph Pulitzer was
born.
Hearst's [errata: Pulitzer's] British
counterparts were fervently devoted to sensation, and especially loved lurid
crime stories. In 1883 a pair of armed burglaries in the London suburbs set off
a round of press hysteria about armed criminals. The press notwithstanding,
crime with firearms was rare. As this Essay will detail, the propensity of the
press to sensationalize what sociologists call "atrocity tales" to create "moral
panics" while demanding greater government regulation is one of the factors
dramatically increasing the risk that a nation will descend down a slippery
slope; but while media sensationalism can spur action, media attention is not
necessarily sufficient by itself to produce results. Eighteen-eighty-three did
see the first serious attempt at gun control in many decades, when Parliament
considered and rejected a bill to ban the "unreasonable" carrying of a concealed
firearm. In 1895, strong pistol controls were rejected by a two to one margin in
the House of Commons.
The developments of the British press, and
the press attitude towards crime and guns in the late 19th century, have their
own parallels in the United States today. Television news is cutting loose its
last ties to traditional standards imposed from the days of print journalism. In
the "infotainment" produced by organizations such as NBC News, depiction of
reality is less important than the production of entertaining and compelling
"news" pieces. Thus, when the "assault weapon" panic of 1989 broke out,
television journalists paid little attention to whether "assault weapons"
actually were the "weapon of choice" of criminals. Instead of being on the
reality of gun (p.407)crime, the focus was on the sensational footage of guns
firing full automatic, while newscasters decried the availability of
semi-automatics. Police statistics show that so-called assault weapons are used
in about 1% of gun crime.[37]
In other contexts, displaying one thing while talking about another would be
decried as fraud.
As the nineteenth century came to a close
in Britain the press had not as yet persuaded the public to adopt gun controls.
Buyers of any type of gun, from derringers to Gatling guns faced no background
check, no need for police permission, and no registration. As criminologist
Colin Greenwood wrote, "[a]nyone, be he convicted criminal, lunatic, drunkard or
child, could legally acquire any type of firearm."[38]
Additionally, anyone could carry any gun anywhere. The English gun crime rate
was at its all-time low. A somewhat similar situation prevailed on the American
frontier in the 1880s where everyone who chose to be, was armed, and "[t]he old,
the young, the unwilling, the weak and the female ... were ... safe from
harm."[39] The frontier crime rates, except for the results of
"voluntary" bar fights among dissolute young men, were less than a tenth of the
rates in modern-day United States and British cities.
The official attitude about guns was
summed up by Prime Minister Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, the Marquess of Salisbury,
who in 1900 said he would "laud the day when there is a rifle in every cottage
in England." Led by the Duke of Norfolk and the mayors of London and Liverpool,
a number of gentlemen formed a cooperative association that year to promote the
creation of rifle clubs for working men. The Prime Minister and the rest of the
aristocracy viewed the widespread ownership of rifles by the working classes as
an asset to national security, especially in light of the growing tension with
imperial Germany.[40] While shotguns were seen as bird-hunting toys of the landed
gentry, rifles were lauded as military arms suitable for everyone. Yet, within a
century, the right to bear arms in Britain would be well on the road to
extinction. The extinction had little to do with gun ownership itself, but
instead related to the British government's growing mistrust of the British
people, and the apathetic attitude of British gun owners.(p.408)
In 1903, Parliament
enacted a gun control law that appeared eminently reasonable. The Pistols Act of
1903 forbade pistol sales to minors and felons and dictated that sales be made
only to buyers with a gun license. The license itself could be obtained at the
post office, the only requirement being payment of a fee. People who intended to
keep the pistol solely in their house did not even need to get the postal
license.[41]
The Pistols Act attracted only slight
opposition, and passed easily. The law had no discernible statistical effect on
crime or accidents. Firearms suicides did fall, but the decline was more than
matched by an increase in suicide by poisons and knives.[42]
The homicide rate rose after the Pistols Act became law, but it is impossible to
attribute this rise to the new law with any certainty. The bill defined pistols
as guns having a barrel of nine inches or less, and thus pistols with
nine-and-a-half inch barrels were soon popular.
While the Act was, in the short run,
harmless to gun owners, the Act was of considerable long-term importance. By
allowing the Act to pass, British gun owners had accepted the proposition that
the government could set the terms and conditions for gun ownership by
law-abiding subjects.[43]
As Frederick Schauer points out, for a government body to decide "X and not Y"
means that the government body has implicitly asserted a jurisdiction to decide
between X and Y. Hence, to decide "X not Y" is to assert, indirectly, an
authority in the future to choose "Y not X."[44]
Thus, for Parliament to choose very mild gun controls versus strict controls was
to assert Parliament's authority to decide the nature of gun control.[45]
As this Essay shall discuss in regards to the granting of police authority over
gun licensing, establishing the proposition that a government entity has any
authority over a subject is an essential, but not sufficient, element for a trip
down the slippery slope.
The early years of
the twentieth century saw an increasingly bitter series of confrontations
between capital and labor throughout the English-speaking world. In Britain, the
rising militance of the working class was beginning to make the aristocracy
doubt whether the people could be trusted with arms. When American journalist
Lincoln Steffens visited London in (p.409)1910, he met leaders of Parliament who
interpreted the current bitter labor strikes as a harbinger of impending
revolution.[46] The next set of gun control initiatives reflected fears of
immigrant anarchists and other subversives.
As the coronation of George V approached,
one United States newspaper, the Boston Advertiser, warned about the
difficulty of protecting the coronation march "so long as there is a generous
scattering of automatic pistols among the 70,000 aliens in the Whitechapel
district." The paper fretted about aliens in the United States and Britain with
their "automatic pistols," which were "far more dangerous" than a bomb. The
Advertiser defined an "automatic pistol" as a "quick-firing revolver,"
and called for gun registration, restrictions on ammunition sales, and a ban on
carrying any concealed gun, all with the goal of "disarming alien criminals."[47]
What was the "automatic
pistol/quick-firing revolver" that so concerned the newspaper? In 1901, the
British company of Webley-Fosberry introduced an "automatic revolver."[48]
It reloaded with the same principle as a semi-automatic pistol, but held the
ammunition in a cylinder, like a revolver. It was an inferior gun. If not
gripped tightly, it would misfire. Dirt and dust made the gun fail. Although the
gun's most deadly feature was, supposedly, its rapid-fire capability, rapid
firing also made the gun malfunction.[49]
The so-called automatic revolver that was "more dangerous than the bomb" was
more dangerous in the minds of overheated newspaper editorialists than in
reality. In this way it is comparable to today's "undetectable plastic gun,"
which is non-existent, and the "cop-killer teflon bullet," which was actually
invented by police officers.[50]
As the Webley-Fosberry and its modern
equivalents show, media pressure for new laws does not necessarily have to be
based on real-world conditions. That is, an item need not necessarily be
particularly dangerous in (p.410)order for the media to describe it as
dangerous. For example, whatever else may be said about marijuana, we now know
that the "Reefer madness" stories from the mass media in the 1920s and 1930s
were scientifically inaccurate; marijuana does not impel users to commit violent
crimes. However, when the media and public know little about an item, such as
Webley-Fosberry revolvers, self-loading firearms, or marijuana, it is easy for
reporters to talk themselves and their audience into a panic.
Whatever the actual
dangers of the automatic revolver, immigrants scared authorities on both sides
of the Atlantic. Crime by Jewish and Italian immigrants spurred New York State
to enact the Sullivan Law in 1911, which required a license for handgun buying
and carrying, and made licenses difficult to obtain. The sponsor at the Sullivan
Law promised homicides would decline drastically. Instead, homicides increased
and the New York Times found that criminals were "as well armed as
ever."[51]
As in modern United States, sensational
police confrontations with extremists also helped build support for gun control.
In December 1910, three London policemen investigating a burglary at a
Houndsditch jewelry shop were murdered by rifle fire. A furious search began for
"Peter the Painter," the Russian anarchist believed responsible. The police
uncovered one cache of arms in London: a pistol, 150 bullets, and some dangerous
chemicals. The discovery led to front-page newspaper stories about anarchist
arsenals, which were non-existent, all over the East End of London. The police
caught up with London's anarchist network on January 3, 1911, at 100 Sidney
Street. The police threw stones through the windows, and the anarchists inside
responded with rifle fire. Seven-hundred and fifty policemen, supplemented by a
Scots Guardsman unit, besieged Sidney Street. Home Secretary Winston Churchill
arrived on the scene as the police were firing artillery and preparing to deploy
mines. Banner headlines throughout the British Empire were already detailing the
dramatic police confrontation with the anarchist nest. Churchill, accompanied by
a police inspector and a Scots Guardsman with a hunting gun, strode up to the
door of 100 Sidney Street; the inspector kicked the door down. Inside were the
dead bodies of two anarchists. "Peter the Painter" was nowhere in sight.
London's three-man anarchist network was destroyed.[52]
The "Siege of Sidney Street" turned out to have been vastly overplayed by both
the police and the press. A violent fringe of the anarchist movement was,
however, a genuine threat; President William McKinley was only one of several
world leaders assassinated by anarchists.(p.411)
While the "Siege of Sidney Street"
convinced New Zealand to tighten its own gun laws, the British Parliament
rejected new controls. Parliament turned down the Aliens (Prevention of Crime)
Bill, that would have barred aliens from possessing [errata: and carrying]
firearms without permission of the local Chief Officer of Police.[53]
The 1993 Virginia legislature had less fortitude than the 1911 British
Parliament. After a Pakistani national used a Kalashnikov rifle to murder three
people outside of CIA headquarters, the Virginia legislature rushed to enact
broad restrictions on gun carrying by legal resident aliens.[54]
British resistance to gun controls
finally cracked in 1914 when Great Britain entered The Great War, later to be
dubbed World War I. The government imposed comprehensive, stringent controls as
"temporary" measures to protect national security during the war. Similarly, the
United States continues to live under various "temporary" or "emergency"
restrictions on liberty enacted during the First or Second World Wars.[55]
Few restrictions on liberty, especially when imposed by fiat, are announced as
permanent. Even when Julius Caesar and, later, Octavian, destroyed the Roman
Republic by making themselves military dictators for life, they claimed to be
exercising only temporary powers because of an emergency.
Randolph Bourne observed that "war is the
health of the state," and it was World War I that set in motion the growth of
the British government to the size where it could begin to destroy the right to
arms, a right that the British people had enjoyed with little hindrance for over
two centuries. After war broke out in August 1914, the British government began
assuming "emergency" powers for itself. "Defense of the Realm Regulations" were
enacted that required a license to buy pistols, rifles, or ammunition at retail.
As the war came to a conclusion in 1918, many British gun owners no doubt
expected that the wartime regulations would soon be repealed and Britons would
again enjoy the right to purchase the firearm of their choice without government
permission. But the government had other ideas.
The disaster of World War I had bred the
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Armies of the new Soviet state swept into
Poland, and more and more workers of the world joined strikes called by radical
labor leaders who predicted the overthrow of capitalism. Many Communists and
other radicals thought the World Revolution was at hand. All over the
English-speaking world governments feared the end. The reaction was fierce. In
the United States, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer launched the "Palmer
raids." Aliens were deported without hearings, and United States citizens were
searched and arrested without warrants and held without bail. While the United
States was torn by strikes and race riots, Canada witnessed the government
(p.412)massacre of peaceful demonstrators at the Winnipeg General Strike of
1919.
In Britain, the government worried about
what would happen when the war ended and the gun controls expired. A secret
government committee on arms traffic warned of danger from two sources: the
"savage or semi-civilized tribesmen in outlying parts of the British Empire" who
might obtain surplus war arms, and "the anarchist or 'intellectual' malcontent
of the great cities, whose weapon is the bomb and the automatic pistol."[56]
At a Cabinet meeting on January 17, 1919, the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff raised the threat of "Red Revolution and blood and war at home and
abroad." He suggested that the government make sure of its arms. The next month,
the Prime Minister was asking which parts of the army would remain loyal. The
Cabinet discussed arming university men, stockbrokers, and trusted clerks to
fight any revolution.[57]
The Minister of Transport, Sir Eric Geddes, predicted "a revolutionary outbreak
in Glasgow, Liverpool or London in the early spring, when a definite attempt may
be made to seize the reins of government." "It is not inconceivable," Geddes
warned, "that a dramatic and successful coup d'etat in some large center of
population might win the support of the unthinking mass of labour." Using the
Irish gun licensing system as a model, the Cabinet made plans to disarm enemies
of the state and to prepare arms for distribution "to friends of the
Government."[58]
Although popular revolution was the
motive, the Home Secretary presented the government's 1920 gun bill to
Parliament as strictly a measure "to prevent criminals and persons of that
description from being able to have revolvers and to use them." In fact, the
problem of criminal, non-political misuse of firearms remained minuscule.[59]
Of course 1920 would not be the last time a government lied in order to promote
gun control.
In 1989 in the United States, various
police administrators and drug enforcement bureaucrats set off a national panic
about "assault weapons" by claiming that semi-automatic rifles were the "weapon
of choice" of drug dealers and other criminals. Actually, police statistics
regarding gun seizures showed that the guns accounted for only about 1% of gun
crime. Most people in the United States swallowed the 1989 lie about "assault
weapon" crime, and most Britons in 1920 swallowed the lie about handgun crime.
Indeed, the carnage of World War I, which was caused in good part by the
outdated tactics of the British and French general staffs, had produced a
general revulsion against anything associated with the military, including
rifles (p.413)and handguns.
Thus the Firearms Act of 1920 sailed
through Parliament. Britons who had formerly enjoyed a right to arms were now
allowed to possess pistols and rifles only if they proved they had "good reason"
for receiving a police permit.[60]
Shotguns and airguns, which were perceived as "sporting" weapons, remained
exempt from British government control.
Similarly, the horror of use of poison
gas during World War I's trench warfare made the Firearms Act's ban on small CS
self-defense spray canisters seem unobjectionable.[61]
In the hands of British citizens, CS was considered by the central government to
be impossibly dangerous, requiring complete prohibition--much more dangerous
than a rifle or shotgun. Yet when the CS is in the hands of the government, the
central government now mandates that CS be considered benign. When local police
authorities protested the Home Secretary's issuance of CS gas and plastic
bullets to local police forces and argued that the central government had no
authority to force police departments to employ dangerous weapons against their
will, the court ruled for the central government on the theory that the Crown's
"prerogative power to keep the peace" allowed the Home Secretary to "do all
reasonably necessary to preserve the peace of the realm."[62]
The treatment of CS is emblematic of the
transformation of British arms policy during the twentieth century. Principles
about the use of force were changed from the traditional Anglo-American to the
Weberian, with the monopoly of force becoming crucial to the state's definition
of its rightful power. Instead of worrying about cheap German handguns among the
people, the British would have been better to guard against fancy German ideas
among the government.
In the early years of
the Firearms Act the law was not enforced with particular stringency, except in
Ireland, where revolutionary agitators were demanding independence from British
rule, and where colonial laws had already created a gun licensing system.[63]
Within Great Britain, a "firearms certificate" for possession of rifles or
handguns was readily obtainable. Wanting to possess a firearm for self-defense
was considered a "good reason" for being granted a firearms certificate.
The threat of Bolshevik revolution, which
had been the impetus for the (p.414)Firearms Act, had faded quickly as the
Communist government of the Soviet Union found it necessary to spend all its
energy gaining full control over its own people, rather than exporting
revolution. Ordinary firearms crime in Britain, which was the pretext for the
Firearms Act, remained minimal. Despite the pacific state of affairs, the
government did not move to repeal the unneeded gun controls, but instead began
to expand the controls.
In 1934, a government task force, the
Bodkin Committee, was formed to study the Firearms Act. The Committee collected
statistics on misuse of the guns that were not currently regulated, such as
shotguns and airguns, and collected no statistics on the guns under control,
namely rifles and handguns. The Committee concluded that there was no persuasive
evidence for repeal of any part of the Firearms Act.[64]
Since the Bodkin Committee had avoided looking for evidence about how the
Firearms Act was actually working, it was not surprising that the Committee
found no evidence in favor of decontrol.
Spurred by the Bodkin Committee, the
British government in 1936 enacted legislation to outlaw (with a few minor
exceptions) possession of short-barreled shotguns and fully automatic
firearms.[65] The law was partly patterned after the 1934 National
Firearms Act in the United States, which taxed and registered, but did not
prohibit, such guns.[66]
In 1973 and 1988, when the government was attempting to expand controls still
further, gun control advocates claimed that the Bodkin Committee report was
clear proof of how well the Firearms Act of 1920 was working, and why its
controls should be extended to other guns.[67]
As a result of alcohol prohibition, the
United States in the 1920s and early 1930s did have a problem with criminal
abuse of machine guns, a fad among the organized crime gangsters who earned
lucrative incomes supplying bootleg alcohol, although most such firearms were
owned by peaceable citizens. The repeal of Prohibition in 1933 had sent the
American murder rate into a nosedive, but in 1934 Congress went ahead and
enacted the National Firearms Act anyway.
In Britain, there had been no alcohol
prohibition, and hence no crime problem with automatics, or other guns. Before
1920, any British adult could purchase a machine gun; after 1920, any Briton
with a Firearms Certificate could purchase a machine gun. During the 1936
British debate, the government could not point to a single instance of a machine
gun being misused in Britain,[68]
yet the guns were banned anyway. The government (p.415)explained its actions by
arguing that automatics were crime guns in the United States and there was no
legitimate reason for civilians to possess them. The same rationale is used
today in the drive to outlaw semi-automatic firearms in the United States. Since
some government officials believe that people do not "need" semi-automatic
firearms for hunting, the officials believe that such guns should be prohibited,
whether or not the guns are frequently used in crime.
"O, reason not the need!" shouted King
Lear after his two traitorous daughters, Regan and Goneril, disarmed him by
taking away his armed retinue.[69]
Goneril and Regan had asked why the King needed even a single armed retainer,
since Goneril's army and Regan's army would protect him. The King's "reason not
the need" response was his way of saying the he should not have to justify what
he wanted; he should not have to convince his daughters that he had a good
reason for wanting to be armed. Unfortunately, for British gun owners, as for
King Lear, it was too late. King Lear had already turned the power in the
kingdom over to Regan and Goneril; British gun owners had agreed that rifle and
pistol ownership should be allowed only when the government, not the citizen,
believed that there was a "good reason" for it. Thus, the burden of proof in
public debate was reversed. The government was not required to show that there
was a need to ban short shotguns or automatic rifles; indeed, the misuse of
these guns in Great Britain was so unusual that the British government could
never have shown a "need" for the bans. Instead, the government faced a much
lower burden. Did the government believe that citizens had a "need" for the guns
in question? Obviously some law-abiding citizens thought they did, since the
citizens had chosen to purchase such guns. For example, short shotguns are easy
to maneuver in a confined setting, and hence are very well-suited for home
defense against a burglar. Likewise, machine guns are enjoyed for target
shooting and collecting, and are useable for home defense.
The Firearms Act of 1920 had not, of
course, banned short shotguns or automatic rifles. The former were ignored by
the Act, while the latter were subject only to a lenient licensing system. The
Firearms Act had, however, moved the baseline for gun control, and had helped to
shift public attitudes. The concept of a "right" to arms was giving way to a
privilege, based on whether the government determined that the would-be
gun-owner had a "need" according to the government's standard.
Frederick Schauer's classic article on
slippery slopes distinguishes the pure slippery slope argument[70]
from its "close relation" that Schauer calls "the argument from excess
breadth."[71] The latter argument points to the danger of adopting a
policy on grounds that are too broad.[72]
He points to the (p.416)example of censorship of information about how to build
nuclear weapons. If the rationale for censorship is excessively broad--"the
information is dangerous to public safety"--then allowing censorship of the
nuclear missile information creates a precedent for censorship of many other
things.[73] In contrast, if the grounds for a restrictive action are
narrow--"this information has a very high risk of directly causing millions of
deaths"--then there is much less risk that a desirable action, like the
censorship nuclear missile construction information, will lead to undesirable
actions, like the censorship of detective novels from which criminals might
learn crime techniques.
The 1934 British ban on short shotguns
and machine guns was a classic instance of the dangers of an excessively broad
rationale. The government decided that nobody outside the government "needed"
such items. Thus, the "good reason" requirement of the 1920 Firearms Act set the
stage for the 1934 gun ban rationale, that "people outside the government don't
need this," which in turn would set the stage for further prohibitions.
Another type of argument that Schauer
identifies as a close relation to the classic slippery slope argument is "the
argument from added authority." Here, the argument is that "granting additional
authority to the decisionmaker inevitably increases the likelihood of a wide
range of possible future events, one of which might be the danger case."[74]
The British Firearms Act of 1920 offers a clear example of the dangers against
which Schauer's "added authority" argument warns. Before the Firearms Act, the
police had no role in deciding who could own a gun. The Firearms Act instructed
them to issue licenses (Firearms Certificates) to all applicants who had a "good
reason" for wanting a rifle or pistol. Starting in 1936 the British police began
adding a requirement to Firearms Certificates that the guns be stored
securely.[75] As shotguns were not licensed, there was no such requirement
for them.
While the safe storage requirement
might, in the abstract seem reasonable, it was eventually enforced in a highly
unreasonable manner by a police bureaucracy often determined to make firearms
owners suffer as much harassment as possible.[76]
More importantly, Parliament--the voice of the people--did not vote to impose
storage requirements on gun-owners. Whatever the merits of the storage rules,
they were imposed not by the representatives of the people, but by
administrators who were acting without legal authority. Without the licensing
system, the police never would have had the opportunity to exercise such illegal
power. As the Essay discusses in more (p.417)detail below, once even the most
innocuous licensing system is in place, it is more possible (although not
necessarily inevitable) that increasingly severe restrictions will be placed on
the licensees by administrative fiat. The recognition of this danger is one
reason why the First Amendment's prohibition on prior restraints is so wise. The
rule prohibiting prior restraint recognizes that any system for licensing the
press creates a risk that system will be administratively abused.
After the fall of
France and the Dunkirk evacuation in 1940, Britain found itself short of arms
for island defense. The Home Guard was forced to drill with canes, umbrellas,
spears, pikes, and clubs. When citizens could find a gun, it was generally a
sporting shotgun, which was ill-suited for most types of military use because of
its short range and bulky ammunition. In November 1940, the American Committee
for the Defense of British Homes placed advertisements in
United States newspapers and in magazines such as American Rifleman
asking readers to "Send A Gun to Defend a British Home--British civilians, faced
with threat of invasion, desperately need arms for the defense of their homes."
The ads pleaded for "Pistols, Rifles, Revolvers, Shotguns and Binoculars from
American civilians who wish to answer the call and aid in defense of British
homes."[77] As a result of these ads, pro-Allied organizations in the
United States collected weapons; the National Rifle Association shipped 7,000
guns to Britain. Britain also purchased surplus World War I Enfield rifles from
the United States Department of War.[78]
Before the war, British authorities had refused to allow domestic manufacture of
the Thompson submachine gun because it was "a gangster gun,"[79]
but when the war broke out, large numbers of American-made Thompsons were
shipped to Britain, where they were dubbed "tommie guns."[80]
Prime Minister Winston Churchill's book
Their Finest Hour details the arrival of shipments of U.S. government
rifles and field artillery pieces in the summer of 1940. Churchill
personally supervised the deliveries to ensure that they were sent on fast
ships, and distributed first to Home Guard members in coastal zones. Churchill
thought that the American donations (p.418) were "entirely on a different level
from anything we have transported across the Atlantic except for the Canadian
division itself." Churchill warned an advisor that "the loss of these rifles and
field-guns [if the transport ships were sunk by Nazi submarines] would be a
disaster of the first order." He later recalled that "[w]hen the ships from
America approached our shores with their priceless arms, special trains were
waiting in all the ports to receive their cargoes." "The Home Guard in every
county, in every town, in every village, sat up all through the night to receive
them .... By the end of July we were an armed nation ... a lot of our men and
some women had weapons in their hands."[81]
As World War II ended[82]
the British government did what it could to prevent the men who had risked their
lives in defense of freedom and Britain from holding onto guns acquired during
the war. Troop ships returning to England were searched for souvenir or captured
rifles and men caught attempting to bring firearms home were punished. Guns that
had been donated by American civilians were collected from the Home Guard and
destroyed by the British government.[83]
In spite of these measures, large quantities of firearms still slipped into
Britain, where many of them remain to this day in attics and under floor boards.
At least some British gun owners, like their United States counterparts in
today's gun-confiscating jurisdictions such as New Jersey and New York City,
were beginning to conclude that their government did not trust them, and that
their government could not be trusted to deal with them fairly. In 1946, the
Home Secretary announced a policy change: henceforth, self-defense would not be
considered a good reason for being granted a Firearms Certificate.[84]
The next rounds of legislative action
were aimed at knives, rather than guns. The 1953 Prevention of Crime Act
outlawed the carrying of an "offensive weapon" and put the burden of proof on
anyone found with an "offensive weapon," such as a knife, to prove that he had a
reasonable excuse. In 1959, the Home Office pushed for, and won, a ban on
self-loading knives. Self-loading knives are knives that use a spring or other
mechanism so that they can be opened with one hand. These "flick knives," as
they were called in Britain, were not any more of a crime problem than other
knives, but the rationale for their ban was the same as for the 1937 ban on
certain guns. The (p.419)government did not see any reason why a person would
need a self-loading knife.[85]
Furthermore, just as machine guns had been associated with American gangsters,
"flick knives," which are called "switchblades" in the United States, were
associated with American juvenile delinquents.
The British government in the 1950s left
the subject of gun control alone. Crime was still quite low, and issues such as
national health care and the Cold War dominated the political dialogue. Even so,
the maintenance of the existing, relatively mild, structure of rifle and pistol
licensing would have important consequences. As the Firearms Act remained in
force year after year, a smaller and smaller percentage of the population could
remember a time in their own lives when a Briton could buy a rifle or pistol
because he had a right to do so rather than because he had convinced a police
administrator that there was a "good reason" for him to purchase the gun. As the
post-1920 generation grew up, the licensing provisions of the Firearms Act began
to seem less like a change from previous conditions and more like part of
ordinary social circumstances. A similar process is at work in the United
States, where only part of the population remembers the days before 1968 when
federal registration was not required for people to purchase firearms.[86]
As in most of the
Western world, the late 1960s in Great Britain was a time of rising crime and
civil disorder. In 1965, capital punishment was abolished, except for treason
and piracy.[87] Gun crime did not seem to be a problem. Scotland Yard stated
"with some confidence" that the objectives of eliminating "the improper and
careless custody and use of firearms ... and making it difficult for criminals
to obtain them ... are effectively achieved."[88]
In June 1966, Home Secretary Roy Jenkins told Parliament that after consulting
with the Chief Constables and the Home Office, he had concluded (as had his
predecessor the year before) that shotgun controls were not worth the trouble,
yet six weeks later, Jenkins announced that new shotgun controls were necessary,
because shotguns were too easily available to criminals.[89]
Had there been a sudden surge in shotgun
crime in the six week period? Not at all, but three policemen at Shephard's Bush
had been murdered with (p.420)illegal revolvers. Popular outcry for capital
punishment was fervent, and Jenkins, an abolitionist, responded by announcing
new shotgun controls, in an attempt to divert attention from the noose.[90]
In retrospect, Mr. Jenkins' shotgun
controls made no logical sense. Regulating shotguns would obviously have no
impact on criminal use of unlicensed revolvers, the guns used to murder the
three policemen. Jenkins claimed that "criminal use of shotguns is increasing
rapidly, still more rapidly than that of other weapons." The "rapidly"
increasing type of crime associated with shotguns, however, involved mostly
poaching or property damage rather than armed robberies or murders.
Nevertheless, by showing that he was "doing something" about crime by proposing
shotgun controls, Mr. Jenkins effectively achieved his main goal, which was to
divert public attention from the death penalty. The Jenkins tactic has been used
by many other politicians since then, including former New York Governor Mario
Cuomo, who is a proponent of gun prohibition and an opponent of the death
penalty.
This brings to light a third factor that
may help push a civil right down the slippery slope: the exercise of the right
may be unproblematic, but pushes for restriction on the right may satisfy
unrelated political needs. The more likely that media or other interest groups
are to be hostile to the exercise of the right, the greater the prospect that
further infringing on the right may fulfill the political need of distracting
attention from other matters.
At Jenkins' request the British government
began drafting the legislation that became the Criminal Justice Act of 1967. The
new act required a license for the purchase of shotguns.[91]
Like the Gun Control Act of 1968 in the United States,[92]
Britain's 1967 Act was part of a comprehensive crime package that included a
variety of infringements on civil liberties. For example, the British Act
abolished the necessity for unanimous jury verdicts in criminal trials,
eliminated the requirement for a full hearing of evidence at committal hearings,
and restricted press coverage of those hearings.[93]
Under the 1967 system, which is still in
force for the most part, a person wishing to obtain his first shotgun needed to
obtain a "shotgun certificate." The local police could reject an applicant if
they believed that his "possession of a shotgun would endanger public safety."
The police were required to grant the certificate unless the applicant had a
particular defect in his background such as a criminal record or history of
mental illness.[94] An applicant was required to supply a countersignatory, a
person who would attest to the accuracy of the information in the application.
During an investigation (p.421)period that could last several weeks, the police
might visit the applicant's home.[95]
In the first decades of the system, about ninety-eight percent of all
applications were granted.
Once the £12 shotgun certificate was
granted, the law allowed a citizen to purchase as many shotguns as he wished.[96]
Private transfers among certificate holders were legal and uncontrolled.[97]
As with the Firearms Act of 1920, the statutory language of the 1967 shotgun law
was eminently reasonable, and unobjectionable except to a civil liberties
purist.
The 1967 law contained one other provision
that illustrated a key strategy of how to push something down a slippery slope:
it is easier to legislate against people who cannot vote, or who are not yet
born, than against adults who want to retain their rights. Reducing the number
people who will, one day in the future, care about exercising a particular right
is a good way to ensure that, on that future day, new restrictions on the right
will be politically easier to enact. Thus, the 1967 law did nothing to take away
guns from law-abiding adults, but the Act did severely restrict gun transfers to
minors. It became illegal for a father to give even an airgun as a gift to his
thirteen-year-old son.[98]
The fewer young people who enjoy the exercise of a civil liberty such as the
shooting sports, the fewer adults there will eventually be to defend that civil
liberty.[99]
This conditioning young people not to
believe they have rights can exist in other contexts, of course. For example,
the current American practice of denying American schoolchildren constitutional
protection from locker searches,[100] dog sniffs, metal detectors, and random drug testing[101] is a good way to raise a generation with little
appreciation for the Fourth Amendment.
As is typical with many
gun control laws, the shotgun certificate system was enforced in a moderate and
reasonable way by the government in the law's first years. Similarly, the rifle
and handgun licensing system, introduced in 1920, had been enforced in a
generally moderate way in the 1920s (p.422)and 1930s. However, as the public
grew accustomed to the idea of rifles and handguns being licensed, it became
possible to begin to enforce the licensing requirements with greater and greater
stringency.
Severe enforcement of the rifle and handgun
licensing system would not have worked in 1922. Too many gun owners would have
been outraged by the rapid move from a free society to one of repressive
controls. By initially enforcing the 1920 legislation with moderation, and then
with gradually increasing severity, the British government acclimated British
gun owners to higher and higher levels of control. The British government used
the same principle as do people who are cooking frogs. If a cook throws a frog
in a pot of boiling water, he will jump out, but if the cook puts a frog in a
pot of moderately warm water, and gradually raises the temperature, the frog
will slowly lose consciousness, and be unable to escape by the time the water
gets to a boil.
The frog-cooking principle helps explain
why America's Handgun Control, Inc. (HCI), and the other anti-gun lobbies are so
desperate to pass any kind of gun control, even controls that most observers
agree will accomplish very little. By lobbying for the enactment of, for
example, the Brady Bill, HCI established the principle of a national gun
licensing system. Once a lenient national handgun licensing system was
established in 1993, the foundation was laid so that the licensing system can
gradually be tightened. The push has already begun, as President Clinton echoes
HCI's demand that Congress close the "loophole" in the Brady Act that allows
private individuals, those persons not in the gun business, to sell firearms to
each other without going through the federal Brady background check.
The British "firearms certificate" system
of 1920 had required that a person who wished to possess a rifle or handgun
prove he had "a good reason."[102] In the early years of the system, self-defense had been
considered "a good reason,"[103] but, by the 1960s, it was a well-established police
practice that only "sporting" purposes, and not self-defense could justify
issuance of a rifle or handgun license. Parliament had never voted to outlaw
defensive gun ownership, but self-defense fell victim to what Schauer calls "the
consequences of linguistic imprecision."[104] When a legal rule is expressed in imprecise terms there is
a heightened risk that subsequent interpreters of the rule may apply the rule
differently than the formulators of the rule would have.[105] Thus, while self-defense was a "good reason" in 1921, in
later decades the government had decided that a "good reason" did not include
(p.423)self-defense. In practice, being a certified member of a
government-approved target shooting club became the only way a person could
legally purchase a pistol.[106]
Under regulations implementing Britain's
1997 Firearms (Amendment) Act, gun club members must now register every time
they use a range, and must record which particular gun they use. If the
gun-owner does not use some of his legally-registered guns at the range often
enough, his permission to own those guns will be revoked.[107]
Having control over rifle and handgun
owners through a licensing system, the police began inventing their own
conditions to put on licenses. The police practice was not entirely legal, but
it was generally accepted by a compliant public. Similar practices occur in
United States jurisdictions such as New York city, where licensing authorities
sometimes add their own, extra-legal, restrictions to handgun licenses. In the
1980s, then-New York Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward told his firearms
licensing staff to refuse to issue any licenses for the Glock pistol. The
prohibition ended when the media found out that Commissioner Ward himself
carried a Glock pistol.
When the safe storage requirement was
introduced for rifles and handguns in the 1930s, it was enforced in a reasonable
manner by the police. Leaving one's handgun on the front porch was not
acceptable; keeping it on a dark closet shelf was perfectly fine. Similarly, in
the few United States jurisdictions that have imposed storage requirements in
recent years, the law is usually enforced in a reasonable manner--at least for
now.
From the 1930s through the 1960s, the
security requirement simply meant that Firearms Certificate holders were told of
their responsibility for secure storage. Starting in the early 1970s, the police
began performing home inspections as part of the Firearms Certificate issuance
in order to assess the applicant's security.[108] After the 1996 Dunblane shootings, some police forces
began performing spot checks on persons who already held Firearms Certificates.
Apparently the home searches were done to make sure that the firearms really
were locked up.
Parliament never granted the police home
inspection authority, nor did Parliament enact legislation saying that a
hardened safe is the only acceptable storage method. However, that is what the
police in many jurisdictions require anyway. In fact, many gun owners who bought
safes that the police said were acceptable are now being forced to buy new safes
because the local police have arbitrarily changed the standards. In many
districts, an "acceptable safe" is now one that can withstand a half-hour attack
by a burglar who arrives with a full set of safe-opening tools.
Sometimes the police require the purchase
of two safes: the first one for the gun and the second one for separate storage
of ammunition. A Briton (p.424)buying a low-powered, £5 rimfire rifle may have
to spend £100 on a safe. Likewise, a person with five handguns (before the 1997
ban) might have been ordered to add a £1000 electronic security system.[109] Added to the cost of the illegal requirement for hardened
safes is the escalating cost of Firearms or Shotgun Certificates. Home
inspections are expensive for the police, and thus the cost of Firearms
Certificates or Shotgun Certificates has been raised again and again, far above
the rate of inflation, in order to cover the costs of the intrusive inspections,
as well as the cost of many gross inefficiencies in police processing of
applications.[110] The net effect of the heavy security costs is to reduce
legal gun ownership by the less wealthy classes, as in the days of Henry VIII,
Charles I, who was later beheaded during the English Civil War, and James II,
who was driven out of the country by the Glorious Revolution.
The increasing severity of the application
of the gun licensing system is no accident. A 1970 internal government document,
the McKay Report was turned into a 1973 British government Green Paper, which
proposed a host of new controls.[111] The British shooting lobbies, however, mobilized and the
Green Paper was withdrawn.[112] Law professor Richard Harding, Australia's then-leading
academic advocate of gun control, criticized the Green Paper as "statistically
defective ... [and] ... scientifically quite useless."[113] Harding was looking at whether the proposed laws would
reduce gun crime, gun suicide, or other gun misuse. The proponents of the Green
Paper, on the other hand, did not care whether more gun control would reduce gun
misuse. The earlier, secret draft of the Green Paper (the McKay Report) had
stated that "a reduction in the number of firearms in private hands is a
desirable end in itself."[114]
The Green Paper was withdrawn thanks to
strong pressure from British gun-owners--and never turned into a formal proposal
for new law (a White Paper). However, the Green Paper still set the government's
agenda for the next two decades. Some parts were saved for introduction when
political circumstances were right, for example after a notorious gun crime.
Other parts soon began to be enforced immediately, by police fiat.
One Green Paper item would have required
prospective rifle hunters to receive written invitation from the owner of the
land where they would shoot, and then take the letter to the police. The police
would investigate the safety of the hunt and other factors before granting
permission. Several Chief Constables adopted this proposal and others from the
Green Paper as "force policy" and enforced them as if they were law.[115] A certificate for rifle (p.425)possession now often
includes "territorial conditions" specifying exactly where the person may
hunt.[116] While it is not legally necessary for shooters to have
written permission to hunt on a particular piece of land, police have been
stopping shooters, demanding written proof of permission, and threatening to
confiscate guns from persons who cannot produce the proof.[117]
Police abuses appear in every aspect of
gun licensing. As Police Review magazine noted: "There is an easily identifiable
police attitude towards the possession of guns by members of the public. Every
possible difficulty should be put in their way." The stated police position is
"to reduce to an absolute minimum the number of firearms, including shotguns, in
hands of members of the public."[118] Thus, without legal authority, the police have begun to
phase out firearms collections by refusing new applications.[119] Police departments have incorrectly told hunters that
certain legal restrictions on hunting with semi-automatics also apply to hunting
with pump-action guns.[120] The police have also, again without legal authority,
required applicants for shotguns capable of holding more than two shells to
prove a special need for the gun.[121] Furthermore, if a policeman has a personal interest in the
shooting sports, that interest may disqualify him from being assigned to any
role in the police gun licensing program. Policemen who know virtually nothing
about guns, but who can be counted on to have a hostile attitude towards gun
owners, are often picked for the gun licensing jobs.
Parliament has no interest in
investigating police abuses of the gun licensing laws. One reason is that many
of the abuses are instigated by the Home Office, which is controlled by the
leaders of the party in power in Parliament. The courts are submissive to police
"discretion." As a formal matter, applicants may appeal police denials of permit
application, but the courts are generally deferential to police decisions.
Hearsay evidence is admissible against the applicant. An appellant does not have
a right to present evidence on his own behalf, nor does an applicant who has
been denied have a right to find out the basis for the denial until the trial
begins.[122] The Labour Party, now in power, argues that rejected
applicants should never be told the basis of the denial.
The only practical way that British gun
owners could have avoided abuse of the licensing laws would have been to resist
the first proposed laws (p.426)that allowed the police to determine who could
get a gun license. However the gun owners never would have dreamed of resisting,
because such a law seemed so "reasonable." Having meekly accepted the wishes of
the police and the ruling party for "reasonable" controls, by the early 1970's
British rifle and handgun owners found themselves in a boiling pot of severe
controls from which escape was no longer possible. British shotgun owners,
ignoring the fate of their rifle and handgun-owning brethren, jumped into their
own pot of then-lukewarm water when they accepted the 1966 shotgun licensing
proposals.
Gun control in Great
Britain now proceeds on two fronts. When a sensational crime takes place,
proposals for gun confiscations and for major new restrictions on the licensing
system are introduced. During more tranquil times, fees are raised and increased
controls are applied to relatively smaller issues.
An example of tranquil-period control was
the Firearms Act of 1982, which introduced restrictive licensing for imitation
firearms that could be converted to fire live ammunition. The original proposal
had been to implement the 1973 Green Paper's outright ban on realistic imitation
or toy firearms. The sponsor of the new law against imitation firearms promised
that it would help stem "the rising tide of crime and terrorism," although he
pointed to no crime or terrorist act committed with a converted imitation
weapon. A new Crossbows Act outlawed purchase by persons under seventeen.[123]
Under new "safety" regulations regarding
explosives, persons who possess modern gunpowder or blackpowder are now subject
to unannounced, warrantless inspections of their home at any time to make sure
that the powder is properly stored. The government, of course, promises that its
inspections will not be unreasonable, but "reasonableness" is often in the eye
of the beholder.[124]
While gun crime is not as common as in the
United States, gun crime incidents inevitably attract sensational media
attention that becomes the basis for further tightening of controls. In the fall
of 1989, for example, a person who had been rejected for membership in a
firearms club stole a handgun from the locked trunk of a club member and shot a
Manchester policeman. In another case a probationary member of a firearms club,
learning that he had a fatal disease, killed one club member, stole a gun from
the club, and shot a personal enemy. The Home Secretary, at the urging of the
(p.427)Manchester police department, issued a new set of restrictions on
firearms clubs, including sharp restrictions on bringing guests to a range to
shoot a firearm.[125] The practical effect of the new restrictions was to reduce
the entry of new members into many firearms clubs.[126]
Thanks to decades of such restrictions
aimed at restricting entry into the shooting sports, the vast majority of the
public has no familiarity with guns, other than what media choose to let them
know.[127] Legal British gun owners now constitute only four percent
of total households,[128] with perhaps another small percentage of the population
possessing illegal, unregistered guns.[129] Given that many Britons have no personal acquaintance with
anyone who they know to be a sporting shooter, it is not surprising that
seventy-six percent of the population supports banning all guns.[130] Thus, the people who used long guns in the field
sports--who confidently expected that whatever controls government imposed on
the rabble in the cities who wanted handguns, genteel deer rifles and hand-made
shotguns would be left alone--have been proven disastrously wrong.
Strong rights usually need a strong
sociological foundation. Approximately half of American homes contain a gun, and
a quarter contain a hand gun. Thus, except in a few cities like New York where
gun ownership is rare, gun bans in the United States are nearly impossible to
enact; too many voters would be unhappy. Consequently gun prohibition in the
United States must focus on very small segments of the gun-owning population.
That is why "assault weapon" bans, which cover only about one or two percent of
the total firearms stock, are so much easier to enact than handgun bans. Even
with "assault weapons," it is usually necessary to exempt the Ruger Mini-14 and
Mini-30 rifles since these rifles, while functionally identical to banned guns,
have too large an ownership base.[131]
A few sensational burglaries in the 1880s
had created the first calls for restrictive British gun laws. A century later,
some sensational crimes would initiate the final stages of British gun
prohibition. In-between the 1880s and the 1980s, an initially reasonable and
then gradually more restrictive licensing system had reduced the number of gun
owners so far that they had little (p.428)political clout. The gun-owners were
of much less political significance than the media, which had become venomously
anti-gun.
On the morning of
August 19, 1987, a licensed gun owner named Michael Ryan dressed up like
Sylvester Stallone's "Rambo" character and shot a woman thirteen times with a
handgun.[132] After shooting at a filling station attendant, he drove to
his home in the small market town of Hungerford, where he killed his mother and
his dog. In the next hour, he went into town and slaughtered fourteen more
people with his handgun and his Chinese-made Kalashnikov rifle. Ryan disappeared
for a few hours, reappeared at 4 p.m. in a school, and killed himself three
hours later.[133] A few days later, a double murder was perpetrated at
Bristol, this one with a shotgun.[134]
The media's reaction, especially the
print media's, was intense. The tabloid press ran editorials instructing the
public how to spot potential mass murderers--advising suspicion of anyone who
lived alone or was generally a "loner," who lived with his mother, or who was a
bit quiet.[135] The tabloid press and the respectable press both pushed
heavily for more stringent gun laws.[136] Pressure also mounted for tighter censorship of violent
television.
The Hungerford atrocity was the only
instance in which a self-loading rifle had been used in a British homicide.
Punishing every owner of an object because one person misused the object might
seem unfair, but two factors worked in favor of prohibition. First, the cabinet
leadership observed that the number of owners of self-loading rifles was
relatively small, so no important number of voters would be offended. Second,
shotgun owners, who are by far the largest group of gun owners, generally
decided that they did not care what the government did to someone else's
rifles.[137]
Parliament responded. Semi-automatic
centerfire rifles, which had been legally owned for nearly a century, were
banned.[138] Pump-action rifles were banned as well, since it was
argued that these guns could be substituted for semi-automatics. Practical Rifle
Shooting, the fastest-growing sport in Britain, vanished temporarily, although
participants eventually switched to bolt-action rifles.[139](p.429)
The shotgunners, however, made a
disastrous error. The Association of Chiefs of Police had long been pushing to
bring shotguns into the restrictive "Section 1" of the Firearms Act, which
strictly controlled rifles and pistols. The ACPO worked out a deal with the
Thatcher administration to take a major step in the ACPO's direction. As part of
the legislation responding to a crime with a rifle, controls on shotguns were
made significantly more stringent. There was little criminological rationale for
the extra restrictions on shotguns; indeed, the extra police personnel required
to administer the licenses would have to be diverted from other tasks. A Home
Office Research Study written the year before Hungerford had concluded:
To make shotguns
subject to the same controls as pistols ... would have considerable resource
implications for the police .... Nor is there any real optimism that anything
would be achieved by such a move since pistols ... are already subject to the
very strict controls and yet ... are used in more cases of armed crime than
shotguns.[140]
As a result of the
1988 law, shotguns that can hold more than two shells at once now require a
Firearms Certificate, the same as rifles and handguns.[141] Moreover, all shotguns must now be registered. Shotgun
sales between private parties must be reported to the police. Buyers of shot
shells must produce a shotgun certificate. Applicants for a shotgun certificate
must obtain a countersignature by a person who has known the applicant for two
years and is "a member of Parliament, justice of the peace, minister of
religion, doctor, lawyer, established civil servant, bank officer or person of
similar standing."[142]
Most importantly, the law specified that
an applicant for a Shotgun Certificate, which was required for shotguns capable
of holding only one or two shells, could be denied if the applicant did not have
a "good reason" for wanting to own shotgun. Although the statute placed the
burden on proof on the police, to show that there was not a good reason, police
practice immediately shifted the burden back to the applicant to show that she
did have a good reason. Self-defense, of course, was deemed not to be good
reason. Persons who were active members of shooting clubs, recreational hunters,
and farmers engaged in pest control were all deemed by the police to have
demonstrated good reason, but a person who merely wanted to retain legal
possession of a family heirloom was not considered by the police to have a
(p.430)good reason.[143] By the time two cycles of renewals for the Shotgun
Certificates, which were only valid for three years, had been completed, the
number of legal owners of shotguns had fallen by a quarter. This sharply
reversed the steady growth of gun ownership in the previous two decades.[144]
While the relatively liberal pre-1988
shotgun system had allowed significant growth in the number of legal shotgun
owners, the greater police discretion over rifles and pistol licenses had
allowed police to reduce continually the number of legal owners of rifles or
pistols. The 256,000 holders of Firearms Certificates in 1968 had been cut to
173,000 by 1994.[145] Approximately one-third of the group of Firearms
Certificate holders owned handguns.
The most important remaining difference
between Firearms Certificates for rifles and pistols and Shotgun Certificates
was that holders of the latter did not need police permission for every new
acquisition. Once a person was granted as Shotgun Certificate, he could still
acquire as many shotguns as he wanted, although he had to report each
acquisition to the government. In contrast, Firearms Certificate holders have
been required, ever since the original Firearms Act of 1920, to receive a
police-granted "variance" for each new acquisition. Generally speaking, the
police are skeptical about claims that Firearms Certificate holders have a "good
reason" for wanting additional guns. Consequently, if a target shooter has one
rifle in the .308 caliber, he will not be allowed to acquire a second rifle in
the same caliber.[146] To bring all shotguns under Section one of the Firearms
Act, a step which has not yet been taken, would have huge implications for
shotgun acquisition. A person who legally owned one 12-gauge shotgun would not
be allowed to own more than one.
Home Secretary Douglas Hurd told an
audience that most the provisions in the 1988 Firearm Act had been prepared long
before Hungerford, and the government had simply been waiting for the right
moment to push them.[147]
The Hungerford cycle
was repeated in 1996 when a pederast[148] named Thomas Hamilton used handguns to murder sixteen
children and a teacher in Dunblane, Scotland. The man was well known as mentally
unstable.[149] He (p.431)had been refused membership in several gun
clubs. Citizens had written to the police asking them to revoke the man's gun
license. Under Great Britain's already restrictive gun laws, the police could
easily have taken away this man's guns. Indeed, the police had already
investigated him seven times, but had done nothing.
The tabloid press went wild with angry
stories about gun-owners, portraying anyone who would own a gun as sexually
inadequate and mentally ill. The Labour Party immediately called for a ban on
all handguns over .22 calibre, using the same rationale that had been employed
in earlier gun bans: "We can think of no good reason why a larger calibre
handgun should ever lawfully be held for sporting purposes."[150] The fact that at least 40,000 Britons engaged in target
shooting with guns over .22 caliber apparently did not qualify as a "good
reason."[151] Thus, "good reason" continued its metamorphosis. In 1921,
"good reason" had meant "the applicant has no nefarious purpose." In 1996, "good
reason" meant "no reason can be good enough, if the gun is a handgun."
The Tory government, headed by John
Major, convened a Dunblane Public Enquiry. The Enquiry received presentations on
firearms policy from groups and experts on all sides of the gun issue. The most
powerful submission, however, based on what the report concluded, came from the
British Home Office. The Home Office presented a report citing claims from two
international studies that high gun ownership rates--even legal, regulated gun
ownership--caused high rates of criminal violence. These claims were seriously
flawed; in Great Britain, within the United States, within Australia, and within
continental Europe, the regions with the highest rates of legal gun ownership
(such as rural England, the Rocky Mountain states, Queensland, and Switzerland)
tend to have the lowest violence rates.[152] But the Dunblane Commission, misled by the Home Office,
came back with a report that recommended dozens of ways to tighten the
already-restrictive gun licensing system, and impose more controls on licensed
gun owners.
The Home Office's deception of the
Dunblane Enquiry highlights another condition that may increase slippery slope
risks: the government's ability to produce "data" that "prove" the need for more
government power. Deliberately misleading data from the government was hardly
unique to the Dunblane Enquiry. In the United States, we have J. Edgar Hoover's
production of false data about interstate car theft to boost FBI funding,[153] deceptive anti-gun research created by the federal Centers
for Disease Control,[154] and a breathtaking variety of lies in support of the "War
on Drugs"[155] to name just (p.432)a few. Television, of course, can also
be deceptive. In 1993, NBC News was caught red-handed rigging pickup trucks to
explode and burn in order to support a news program.[156] Since the term "assault weapon" came into the media
vocabulary, the technique of showing footage of machine guns firing in
fully-automatic mode while the voice-over discusses other types of firearms has
become routine. This practice continues even after the station acknowledges that
the image is false or the result of outright fakery.[157]
While the Dunblane Enquiry did recommend
many new controls, the Enquiry did not recommend banning all handguns.[158] Prime Minister John Major's Conservative government had
decided to accept what it knew would be the Cullen recommendations, tightening
the licensing system still more, but not banning handguns. However, then Labour
Party leaders brought Dunblane spokesperson Anne Pearston to a rally, and, in
effect, denounced opponents of a handgun ban as accomplices in the murder of
school children. Prime Minister Major, who was already doing badly in the polls,
crumbled. He promptly announced that the Conservative government would ban
handguns above .22 caliber, and .22 caliber handguns would have to be stored at
shooting clubs, not in homes.[159]
A few months later, Labour Party leader
Tony Blair was swept into office in a landslide. One of his first acts was to
complete the handgun ban by removing the exemption for .22s.[160] The Home Office was unable to produce any statistics
regarding the use of .22 pistols in crime.[161] Prior data showed that the Firearms Certificate system
worked about as well as any human system could to keep criminals from lawfully
acquiring guns, or from stealing them from lawful owners. A study by the London
Metropolitan Police Inspector of 657 armed robberies in the London area from
January 1988 to June 1991 found that half the robberies were perpetrated with
imitation firearms. Of the remaining 328 real weapons, only one involved a gun
which had ever been within the Firearms Certificate system.[162] Dunblane was the only British mass murder in this century
with a lawfully registered pistol. But gun ownership in general, and pistols in
particular, had become rare, and consequently anathematized, once a few
generations had (p.433)grown up under the regime created by the Firearms Act of
1920. A two-to-one majority in Parliament found it commonsense that the crime of
one person should lead to the collective punishment of 57,000 others.
Since 1921, all lawfully-owned handguns
in Great Britain are registered with the government, so handgun owners have
little choice but to surrender their guns in exchange for payment according to
government schedule. Gun registration has laid a foundation for confiscation not
only in Great Britain, but also in New York City, where the 1967 registration
system for long guns was used in the early 1990s to confiscate lawfully owned
semiautomatic rifles. Nevertheless, United States gun control advocates continue
to insist that the United States gun rights advocates are "paranoid" for
resisting registration because it might lead to confiscation. The gun control
advocates reason that they do not intend to confiscate registered guns. However,
the gun control advocates fail to consider what their successors might advocate.
The British Parliament who created the gun registration system in 1920 had no
intention of banning handguns. But that 1920 Parliament failed to foresee the
danger that a registration system, even if created with the best intentions,
could later be used for confiscation. Thus, it is eminently sensible for civil
liberties advocates in the United States to resist registration of persons who
exercise constitutional rights, not because registration is excessively
burdensome in itself, but because registration amounts to greasing the slippery
slope.[163]
The handgun ban by no
means has satiated the anti-gun appetite in Great Britain. When Scottish handgun
owners dutifully surrendered their handguns many of them applied for permits to
own rifles or antique handguns that remained legal. The Scottish Home Affairs
Minister announced that he wanted "to send a very powerful message" against
acquisition of alternative "weapons [that] are currently legal." He announced
that the Scottish government would begin considering whether to tighten controls
on shotguns.[164] Consequently, while British gun owners gracefully gave
away the right to own guns for protection, they are now finding their privilege
to own guns for sport is under greater attack than ever. Britain's leading
anti-hunting group, the League Against Cruel Sports, points to the "hundreds" of
people killed by guns and "thousands" of guns used in robberies and demands a
ban on all guns.[165] The Blair government has announced plans to study whether
airguns[166] should be brought into the gun licensing system,
(p.434)and whether the age limit on gun possession should be raised, which would
prevent most teenagers from using firearms, even under adult supervision. A ban
on all rifles above .22 caliber except for deer hunting is expected, along with
a requirement that shotgun owners receive government permission each time they
acquire a shotgun, as rifle owners currently must.[167]
A ban on all real guns will probably not
suffice, however. Many British gun owners now own deactivated "replica" guns
that cannot be fired. The guns are merely decorative pieces, and are less
dangerous than a cricket bat. For some gun owners, deactivation was the only way
they could retain possession of a prized semiautomatic. Other gun owners simply
found the hassles of the police licensing system too much to overcome, and had
their family heirloom guns deactivated into non-firing ex-weapons. With
deactivation, at least, the family could retain the gun without need to spend
vast sums on police security requirements. This last "loophole," however, in the
British gun laws may be closed in a few years, as the police are now lobbying to
require that owners of deactivated or replica guns get the same license that
would be required for guns which can fire ammunition.
Have all these controls and abusive
enforcement of controls actually made Britain safer? Armed crime in Britain is
higher than it has been in at least two centuries. Armed crime is literally one
hundred times more common than at the turn of the century when Britain had no
weapons controls. Crime victimization surveys show that, per capita, assault in
England and Wales occurs between two and three times more often than in the
United States. These same surveys demonstrate that robbery occurs 1.4 times
more, and burglary occurs 1.7 times more.[168] In contrast to criminologists in the United States,
British criminologists have displayed little interest in studying whether their
nation's gun laws do any good. Accordingly, definitive statements about cause
and effect should be avoided. One can, however, say that as British gun laws
have grown more severe, the country has grown more dangerous.
A.V. Dicey's classic
The Law of the Constitution, "the most celebrated exposition of the rule
of law,"[169] explained that the British common law of self-defense
allowed deadly force to be used only as last resort in great peril. Dicey used a
lawful shooting to illustrate the rule:
A is struck by a
ruffian, X; A has a revolver in his pocket. He must not then and there fire
upon X, but, to avoid crime, must first (p.435)retreat as far as he can. X
pursues; A is driven up against a wall. Then, and not till then, A, if he has
no other means of repelling attack, may justifiably fire at X.[170]
Moreover, because
citizens were legally bound to prevent the commission of certain particularly
dangerous felonies committed in their presence by strangers, the killing of a
nighttime burglar without first retreating was lawful, wrote Dicey.[171] Dicey illustrated the prevention-of-felony rule by quoting
a judge's advice that the proper action to take upon discovering a nighttime
burglar was to shoot him in the heart with a double-barreled shotgun.[172]
Today, as a result of Parliament's 1967
abrogation of the common law rules on justifiable use of deadly force, should a
person use a firearm for protection against a violent home intruder, he will be
arrested, and a case will be brought against him by the Crown Prosecution
Service.[173] In one notorious case, an elderly lady tried to frighten
off a gang of thugs by firing a blank from her imitation firearm. She was
arrested and charged with the crime of putting someone in fear with an imitation
firearm.[174]
With gun ownership for self-protection now
completely illegal (unless one works for the government), Britons have begun
switching to other forms of protection. The government considers this an
intolerable affront. Having, through administrative interpretation,
delegitimized gun ownership for self-defense, the British government has been
able to outlaw a variety of defensive items. For example, non-lethal chemical
defense sprays, such as Mace, are now illegal in Britain, as are electric stun
devices.[175]
Some Britons are turning to guard dogs.[176] Unfortunately dogs, unlike guns and knives, have a will of
their own and sometimes attack innocent people on their own volition. The number
of people injured by dogs has been rising, and the press is calling for bans on
Rottweilers, Dobermans, and other "devil dogs." Under 1991 legislation, all pit
bulls must be neutered or euthanized.
Other citizens choose to protect themselves
with knives, but carrying a knife for defensive protection is considered illegal
possession of an offensive weapon. One American tourist learned about this
Orwellian offensive weapon law the hard way. After she used a pen knife to stab
some men who were attacking her, a British court convicted her of carrying an
offensive weapon. Her intention to use the pen knife for lawful defensive
purposes (p.436)converted the pen knife, under British legal newspeak, into an
illegal "offensive weapon."[177] In 1996, knife-carrying was made presumptively illegal,
even without the "offensive" intent to use the weapon defensively. A person
accused of the crime is allowed "to prove that he had a good reason or lawful
authority for having" the knife when he did.
Early one evening in March 1987, Eric
Butler, a fifty-six-year-old executive with B.P. Chemicals, was attacked while
riding the London subway. Two men came after Butler and, as one witness
described, began "strangling him and smashing his head against the door; his
face was red and his eyes were popping out." No passenger on the subway moved to
help him. "My air supply was being cut off," Butler later testified, "my eyes
became blurred and I feared for my life." Concealed inside Butler's walking
stick was a three-foot blade. Butler unsheathed the blade; "I lunged at the man
wildly with my swordstick. I resorted to it as my last means of defense." He
stabbed an attacker's stomach. The attackers were charged with unlawful
wounding. Butler was tried and convicted of carrying an offensive weapon. The
court gave him a suspended sentence, but denounced the "breach of the law which
has become so prevalent in London in recent months that one has to look for a
deterrent."[178] Butler's self-defense was the only known instance
of use of a swordstick in a "crime."[179] Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, using powers granted under
the 1988 Criminal Justice Act, immediately outlawed possession of swordsticks.[180] The Act has also been used to ban blowpipes and other
exotica which, while hardly a crime problem, were determined by the Home
Secretary not be the sorts of things which he thought any Briton could have a
good reason to possess.[181]
No prosecution for defending oneself is too
absurd. Consider a report from the Evening Standard newspaper in London,
dated October 31, 1996:
A man who uses a
knife as a tool of his trade was jailed today after police found him carrying
three of them in his car. Dean Payne, 26, is the first person to be jailed
under a new law making the carrying of a knife punishable by imprisonment.
Payne told ... magistrates that he had to provide his own knife for his job
cutting straps around newspaper bundles at the distribution plant where he
works .... Police found the three knives--a lock knife, a small printer's
knife, and a Stanley knife--in a routine search of his car.... The court
agreed he had no intention of using the knives for "offensive" purposes but
jailed him for two weeks anyway.(p.437)
....
[The magistrate said]
"I have to view your conduct in light of the great public fear of people going
around with knives...I consider the only proper punishment is one depriving
you of your liberty." |